Cervix Is Really High 2 Days Before Period

Is the stock cheap? I'm not going to undersell

commented in the trap of PER and dividend PER how low they were then were not shopping occasion. When the cycle changes, the low PER usually no more than vestiges of past profits, as often the prices begin to reflect the deterioration in expectations before PER begin to reflect the drop in profits. However, inexperienced investors are usually duped by these tempting rates and are holding right at the worst possible time of the cycle. There are few investors have been buying shares of banks at the same rate as their prices were falling, blinded for a few ratios that were just memories of a past that will not return. On the stock is trading what are the expectations, not the present.

When the economic cycle will be approaching the bottom, starting to happen just the opposite: despite falling stock prices, profits down as much (or turn into losses) the PER rise. It seems obvious that a company is in losses is zero (at least not necessarily), which say that economic cycles distort the validity of the PER as a method to identify whether a stock is cheap or expensive.

To some extent mitigate this effect we use the P/E10, using the average of the benefits of the previous 10 years.






see in the chart above how this 10-year average PER of the S & P500, popularized by Yale professor Robert Shiller was at 15.4 in late 2008. It is considered a good opportunity to purchase bear market when low of 10, which was still far then.

Today, after recent drops in the stock market, would be at 13 times. Let's take

earnings estimates Standard & Poor's in 2009 and 2010. Calculate what level of contribution of the S & P500 P/E10 would correspond to a 10. We take an estimated profit of $ 32.41 for 2009 and $ 39.59 for 2010.

With these data we obtain the level of 562 points S & P500 for a 10-year average PER of 10 in late 2009, implying a 25% further decline from current levels. End of 2010, the level would be 544 points S & P500. That would be the level that drilled down would indicate a good buying opportunity as average profits over the past ten years. Of course, this is an indicator, and not the philosopher's stone. We could not get to see the 10 and miss the opportunity to purchase but if we go above has to be clear that the valuation of the stock market is not as cheap as it may seem at first glance. As additional consideration should be borne in mind that although the average PER of ten years is a prudent set of valuation, we must not forget that just the previous ten years have been characterized by corporate profits based on a very high water consumption was produced through a result of a senseless debt credit bubble. We have become accustomed to living spending well above real income, and this has been completed. The housing bubble produced a wealth effect that encouraged the over-consumption, and that in the case came to consume American revaluation of housing through new borrowing. After


P/E10 see that level of less than 10, it should be confirmed through other important indicators such as the ECRI , unemployment, durables orders , Crossover ITRAXX and HMI .

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"I will not undersell" has become the buzzword of English with property for sale.


(A must read before Buy a home now that they have fallen )

According to the dictionary - undersell: Selling cheaply, with little or no profit

Human nature never ceases to amaze me. Assimilate naturally in a little over a decade, housing prices have risen from 700 € / m2 to 2500 € / m2, which represents an increase of more than 250%, but to sell 10% below maximum price achieved what we consider a weak own stupidity.

Do not assume that "selling off" once again see past prices?, Do we have today a 250% pay more than 10 years ago?, Will you return the banks to pay obscene amounts submileuristas in precarious jobs?, is there a baby boom among the new generations applicants for housing?

saw the entry above, Buy a home now that they have fallen , as there are none of these circumstances, so there is no favorable factor to be kept artificially high housing prices.

We exemplify the case today who can sell a flat 10-15% below the peak reached prefers not miserable price and expect not really know what.

fotocasa.es According to the index, the current average price of housing in Spain is € 2,541 / m2. According to the same real estate portal, from highs of housing has fallen by 13.92%, and during the past year has been 9.2%.

Accordingly, an owner of a middle floor (90 m2) is losing € 21,000 each year by the depreciation , and remember to return to the historical ratio of house prices and household income (which they always reverts ), prices have to fall about 50% from highs, which is not a catastrophe after rising by 250%.

If the owner decides to rent the house, she will receive about € 805 per month, also according to the average price index Fotocasa, which lost "only" € 11,340 per year. All this without considering taxes, maintenance, spill or the life property and does not increase with each passing year, as some seem to believe.

If in addition it appeared that the floor has been purchased with borrowed money on top of the market, the numbers would be shocking. The floor would have cost € 228,690, with expenses and taxes would be around 250,000 €. With a 30-year loan, even assuming that the Euribor be kept at low levels and considering an average point differential during the first seven years would pay on average € 600 per month interest-only, for a total fee of 1,071 € . € 7,200 / year of money thrown in interest, together with the € 21,000 annual depreciation would mean an annual loss of € 28,200 per year for the owner who had bought on the roof and were paying their mortgage.

€ 28,200 With that money we could rent three floors lying like bought, because do not forget that within that amount is not considered the amortization of the mortgage, only money that could be considered as actually invested. Shopping at the ceiling is pulled three times each year by renting money. Really

that those who sell cheaper today than yesterday is selling off? Yes, indeed, is selling off as defined in the SAR, since in some cases would be selling low or no gain (or loss), but might be more sensible about the expected future price of housing.


enclose below an interesting video on the U.S. housing bubble, the time during which he denied its existence.

now know that U.S. prices have fallen almost 40% since the outbreak, and its overvaluation in the ceiling was much lower than in Spain today.

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The yard and the bag.

always interesting to try to draw conclusions studying the behavior of the stock during unusual events. Let's see what happened in Argentina in the yard, and what made the stock at that time.

A brief chronology is as follows:

• Mid 1998: Argentina into recession at the end of the second term of Carlos Menem.
• December 2000: Economy Minister Jose Luis Machinea negotiated a package of 40,000 million dollars to delay payments from the state, who was suffocated. The export sector was badly hit by the fixed exchange rate tied to the dollar (such as Spain linked to the euro, when the peseta was devalued in the things got a bit ugly).
• March 2001: Begins run on deposits.
• June 2001: De la Rua asks for help from the IMF and the banks.
• August 2001: Act "inviolability of the deposits."
• October 2001: 16.3% Unemployment .
• November 2001: Fall 11.6% in industry, construction 18.1%, 27.5% in the automotive industry.
• December 2001: Decree 1570/2001, whereby you can not withdraw more than $ 250 pesos per week or the total of accounts that are in each financial institution. Unable to transfer money abroad, but foreign trade. Argentines feared a departure from convertibility, and was intended to stop a crack bank (as today is English who fear leaving Spain euro). Not surprisingly, these measures were crippled the economy of Argentina and came public debt default of Argentina .
• January 2002: Eduardo Duhalde repealing convertibility. It sets the official exchange rate at 1.4 pesos per dollar. In contrast, keeping the dollar in exchange for a weight of debt.
• February 2002: are transformed dollar deposits into pesos at a rate of 1.4 pesos per dollar. Debts are also converted to pesos, but the change of one peso per dollar. The banks were offset by the asymmetry.
  

Spain would be difficult to return to the penny because the huge housing bubble country has been financed in euros to be in large part to European institutions, and a new devaluation of the peseta hinder the return of such loans unless the State compensate him. We are talking about a English mortgage debt of 700,000 million euros, making it virtually impossible to compensation from the state banks foreign. And for citizens of the mortgage, euro debt growing every devaluation would be unaffordable in many cases.

Rather than draw parallels between Argentina and Spain (any), my intention in this post is to show the behavior of the stock in Argentina, through its Merval index during those turbulent years.




As shown in the chart above, after reaching 869 points, the Merval hit 300 points during the 1998 recession. Came up after 100%!, Until in 2000 and 2001 the economy's problems became more apparent. And so it came to default Argentina's public debt at the end of 2001, the Merval index lost 200 points.

During those months of declines in the stock and total loss of confidence in the economy, the financial system and the government, surely some thought that the "worst was over" and bought stock. The index would fall and they accumulated losses.

would in almost any time upside, as they exist today, except when it came default. That certainly gave in the last bull and sold the last bargain hunter. And obviously, that was the time to buy, and it did was able to multiply their investment by 12.

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The curious behavior of ETFs

comments In ETFs oil 2 an interesting debate has emerged about the curious behavior of leveraged and inverse ETFs on the evolution of the underlying. It turns out that side trends in all these ETFs usually lose but there is no variation between the initial and final price of the underlying . It is not any strange twist of ETF manager, but that is simply because the movements against Minor capital more severely if there is leverage, and the yields are to be implemented later on an already reduced capital, the result can be quite disappointing final.

Laterality and volatility is the enemy number one inverse and leveraged ETFs if there is no clear trend. The strong diurnal variations, one day in one direction and the next day will instead decapitalizing the ETF. Consider a core that is now worth 100, am 80, past 90 and the other 100. It seems obvious that any underlying ETF with that price should not vary during that period, or do so minimally. The first day the underlying loses 20%, the second day gains by 12.5% \u200b\u200band third climbs to 11.1%.

Therefore, the ETF will be worth over 100 * 0.8 * 1,125 * 1,111 = 100. The leveraged ETF x2 (which varies daily double that underlying) worth 100 * 0.6 * 1.25 * 1,222 = 91.65. The short ETF will be worth 100 * 1.2 * 0,875 * 0,889 = 93.35. The leveraged short ETF would be worth 100 * 1.4 * 0.75 * 0,778 = 81.69. As we see, not only over leveraged ETF really the underlying replica. With any of the other, for a lateral movement is lost.

Let's find a real example of the market. The SP500 from 3 March to 18 June 2008 remained virtually unchanged. Increased from 1331 to 1338 pts. If we take the ProShares ETFs on the index in that period, we see how the leveraged lost 0.3%, the short lost 1.8% and short leveraged lost 4.2%. Neither is a great loss, but now let's take the period from the October 9, 2008 to January 8, 2009. The SP500 was at 910 pts at the beginning of the period and finished well, but this period has been more volatile and more ups and downs, not getting anywhere. Let's see how they did ETFs: the leveraged lost 12.1%, the 22.1% missed short and leveraged short lost 36.4%. Conclusion: in times of turbulence and no clear trend, better flee leveraged and short ETFs (and the other almost as well.)


If the trend is strong, there is the curious fact that if we simultaneously bought a bull and a bear ETF, accounting for individual performance of each, usually won when seems logical that one should yield to the other ring. Not that this is the philosopher's stone, as are many exceptions. For example, the ProShares Ultra Technology has fallen 78.84% since October 31, 2007. Clearer downward trend impossible. And yet, buy it and its opposite simultaneously would lose in the same period by 8.5%. But I say that usually wins the combined buying an ETF and its inverse, provided there is clear trend, and as we see, far from always the case.


Now for another interesting concern raised by a reader is more interesting to know if you get short on a long ETF to buy an ETF short. In the previous example, the ETF ProShares Ultra Short Technology from on 31/10/2007 to date we have produced a 61.8% profit. Let us assume that we get shorter as collateral demanded 100%, which is a very big. Interestingly would win a 78.85% short putting in long ETF. Those same ETFs, from 08/15/2008 to 20/11/2008 contradict that first impression, because the short would rise by 171.6% while long-short ourselves we only had reported a 74.47%. put ourselves in an ETF short length limits the benefits to us, which can never exceed 100% because we repurchased never below zero. If the trend is another side that is clearly better be short in the long ETF, since the same initial and final price just lose money, while we have seen that the short-SP500 ETF lost quite volatile at times erratic upward and downward, even without changes in the underlying between initial and final prices. We have seen the case lateral and bassist. Let's see a third case: get bearish with a bullish ETF sold in a rising market. We again UltraTechnology ProShare ETFs. Against trend, we lose bassist 38.2%, while the ETF shorts get bullish causes us loss of 52.2%.

A non-negligible risk is to buy a bass limits our loss ETF initial investment, while short in a bull get our potential becomes unlimited losses if the underlying goes on and on up.

Another question is whether we can get our broker ETFs short durations, which we could do through CFDs on ETFs.